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The Radiation Hardened Electronics for Space Exploration (RHESE) project develops
the advanced technologies required to produce radiation hardened electronics, processors,
and devices in support of the anticipated requirements of NASA's Constellation program.
Methods of protecting and hardening electronics against the encountered space environment
are discussed. Critical stages of a spaceflight mission that are vulnerable to radiation-
induced interruptions or failures are identified. Solutions to mitigating the risk of radiation
events are proposed through the infusion of RHESE technology products and deliverables
into the Constellation program's spacecraft designs.
Nomenclature
°C = Temperature (degrees Celsius)
I. Introduction
ASA has embarked on a new initiative that is designed to return humans to the lunar surface and to
subsequently establish a lunar infrastructure that will enable sustained human presence there. This lunar
exploration effort is performed in preparation for human exploration of Mars and potentially other Solar System
destinations. Known as the Vision for Space Exploration 2 (VSE), this endeavor has as its fundamental goal the
advancement of scientific, security, and economic interests within the United States of America through a robust
space exploration program. To fulfill the VSE, NASA must not only invest in the flight vehicles required to return
man to the moon, but must also invest in the advanced technologies and capabilities required to enable these flight
vehicles and their missions.
The Radiation-Hardened Electronics for Space Exploration (RHESE) project is one of many technology
development projects within the Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP). The ETDP supports a
wide array of technology development efforts needed for accomplishing the goals of the VSE. The RHESE project
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ismanagedbyNASA'sMarshallSpaceFlightCenter(MSFC),whiletheETDPismanagedbyNASA'sLangley
ResearchCenter(LaRC).
RHESEendeavorstoadvancethecurrentstate-of-the-artinradiationhardenedlectronicsbydevelopinghigh
performancedevicesrobustenoughtowithstandtheextremeradiationandtemperaturelevelsencounteredwithin
thespaceandlunarenvironments.TheprimarycustomersofRHESEtechnologieswillbetheflightprojectsbeing
developedin fulfillmentof thegoalsof theVSE.CollectivelyknownasNASA'sConstellationprogram,these
flightprojectsincludetheOrionCrewExplorationVehicle,theAresV CrewLaunchVehicle,theLunarLander
project,heLunar Outpost project, and the Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) hardware required for Personal Life
Support Systems. Secondary customers for RHESE technologies include NASA science missions, collaborative
efforts with other agencies of the US Govemment, and commercial applications.
II. Radiation Hardening for the Space Environment
It has long been known that the space environment poses a particular radiation hazard to both organic and
inorganic materials. In general, the high energy particles that constitute the radiation hazard within the space
environment originate from three sources2:
- Proton and electron radiation trapped within the Earth's magnetic field,
- Solar coronal mass ejections,
- Galactic cosmic rays (GCRs).
The high energy particles encountered in the space environment typically possess energies that range from the
lower level of less than one MeV as possessed by particles in the Earth's radiation belts to beyond the predicted
upper limit of-5xl019 MeV (known as the Greisen-Zatsepin-Kuzmin (GZK) limit 3'4) as inexplicably possessed by
extremely energetic galactic cosmic rays. At these energies, the particles are capable of passing deep into, and in
some cases completely through, the encountered material, causing localized ionization and occasional atomic
displacement. Because electronics operate based on the principle of controlled carrier diffusion within the
semiconductor material, the flood of ions produced by a localized passing of a single high energy particle easily
causes the electronic device to perform unpredictably. This occurrence is generally known as a Single Event Effect
(SEE).
Though sources of space radiation are well understood and characterized, the problem still remains of how to
protect the spacecraft, its occupants, and its electronics from the deleterious effects experienced when encountering
space radiation. Multiple solutions exist that provide some level of protection from space radiation. The most basic
solution is the matter of shielding the radiation-sensitive portions of the spacecraft with additional material. By
including additional material around the component to be protected, there is a much greater chance that the high
energy particle will be stopped via its interaction with the shielding material prior to reaching the component. The
obvious problem with using shielding on a spacecraft is the mass penalty paid when attempting to place the entire
system in orbit. One interesting approach to shielding includes the strategy for a manned mission to carry the
potable and waste water in locations that provide maximal radiation shielding 5 - thus serving two purposes. It
should also be realized that shielding will protect from lower energy particles, but higher energy particles may
penetrate the shielding regardless of its practical thickness.
Another consideration in protecting a spacecraft from radiation damage includes the aspect of mission design. If
it is possible to select a mission profile that minimizes the exposure of a spacecraft to the environmental radiation
and damage from thermal conditions, then this should be included in the mission design trade space. As an
example, if a spacecraft's orbit can be placed such that it minimizes its encounters with the trapped radiation of
Earth's radiation belts, then this should be considered as a factor in the design trade space. By a similar argument, if
a lunar landing location may be selected such that it minimizes direct exposure to the sun by allowing the landing
site to spend half a lunar orbit with the lunar body acting as a shield from potential solar particles, then this too
should be considered. However, this trade must be made against the benefits of solar exposure to power generation
systems and thermal regulation considerations.
Another approach to providing operational assurance is the process of designing critical systems to include
redundant electronic strings of components, thereby reducing the change that space radiation will cause adverse
effects in the final expected performance of the system. The spacecraft designer may choose to implement triple
module redundancy (TMR) within the logic circuits of the flight electronic component 6. This approach involves
using three strings of logic circuitry that all feed a voting string of logic circuitry. Between the three voting circuits,
the majority digital state [s forwarded as the solution while the minority digital state is discarded. The practice of
TMR may be extended beyond the digital circuitry level to including multiple components, processors 7, and even
subsystems 8 that feed an overlying layer of voting logic to determine the majority answer. This approach to
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radiationhardeningcanbelooselyidentifiedasRadiationHardeningbyArchitecture(RHBA).Onecouldarguein
anextremecaseofredundantsystemengineeringthatmultipleandtotallyredundantspacecraftwouldstatistically
improvethechancesofmissionsuccess 9. However, in the case of manned missions, there are no redundant crews.
Even in the case of an unmanned mission, redundant spacecraft are expensive. The process of assembly, verification
and validation of flight hardware, launch services, and operations, could nearly double a mission's cost.
Radiation Hardening By Design (RHBD) is the next level of hardening of electronic components. RHBD
implies that an electronic part or board has been radiation-hardened by virtue of the component layout and circuit
architecture of on-chip gates, devices, and interconnects independent of any special fabrication process or technique.
Examples of RI-/BD techniques include using TMR strategies within the chip layout, designing dopant wells and
isolation trenches into the chip layout, implementing error detecting and correction circuits 1°, and device spacing
and decoupling. Disadvantages to these techniques include the extra devices required to implement TMR, the extra
power load these devices consume, and the extra chip area required to isolate devices, gates, and latches.
Radiation Hardening By Process (RHBP) is the final and lowest level of hardening where the actual electronic
transistor components of the electronic device have been fabricated with process techniques that temper the
component against a SEE radiation event. Material selection, insulation layers, doping levels, and proprietary
processing steps are a part of RHBP. Unfortunately, this is an expensive method for radiation hardening as the
process that hardens the part is dependent on dedicated foundry lines and part runs. The market for radiation
hardened devices is very limited and the expense of developing a new component using a RHBP usually does not
justify the effort - particularly when the part is customized for a spacecraft application where a run of approximately
ten to twenty parts would completely satisfy the spacecraft's test and assembly needs. Because of the expense and
special foundry requirements to produce electronics that utilize RHBP techniques, the capabilities of these RHBP
radiation-hardened electronics (power consumption, processor speed, feature size, etc.) tends to lag the commercial
electronics capabilities by a decade or more.
Of course, the spacecraft designer has the option of implementing any or all of these radiation damage mitigation
techniques in any combination. Depending on the criticality, value, and acceptable risk associated with the mission
being developed, the specified hardness of the onboard electronics may range from commercial-grade parts arranged
with no redundancy under minimal shielding to parts that are radiation hardened via RHBP techniques running in a
TMR voting configuration under heavy localized material shielding. It is therefore obvious that the process of
developing a flight system, complete with modern electronics and avionics, capable of continual operation within
the extreme environments of space, is not a trivial task.
IIl. Constellation Customer Requirements and Needs
Developers of the projects comprising NASA's Constellation program must define the trade space associated
with the required hardness of the avionics and electronics that will eventually return humans to the moon. In fact, so
critical is this process to NASA's success in spaceflight that spacecraft developers have defined a Radiation
Hardness Assurance (RHA) methodology process 11. In general, the process may be described by the following
steps:
1) define the radiation hazard,
2) evaluate the hazard,
3) define the requirements to be met by the spacecraft's electronics,
4) evaluate the electronics to be used,
5) engineer processes to mitigate hazard damage, and
6) iterate on the methodology, if and when necessary.
To promote the successful implementation of RHA for NASA missions, the RHESE project aims to deliver products
that assist in mitigating the hazard damage. However, it is not acceptable to wait until all requirements have been
established before this task is undertaken. The RHESE project is therefore supplementing the known requirements
of the Constellation Program with derived requirements of electronic performance and capability metrics based on
multiple inputs, including architecture studies, working group discussions, interchange discussions, and RHESE
team-resident knowledge of system and architecture objectives. These project-level capabilities drive the goals of
the RI-IESE project tasks and are listed in Table 1.
Not all of the listed capabilities and performance parameters will be applicable to all RHESE project tasks. But
they do provide a metric for measuring the maturity of a particular technology. Measuring the performance value
through test provides a method of determining the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 12. TRL levels are discussed
further in Section IV of this paper.
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Table 1. Performance Parameters for RHESE _ment Tasks
Total Ionizing Dose (TID)
Single Event Upset Rate
Single Event Latch-Up Threshold
Sustained Processor Performance
Sustained Processor Efficiency
Speed of Dynamic Reconfiguration
Temperature Range
Redundancy and Reconfigurability
Radiation Model Accuracy
Storage Density
Storage Efficiency
Mrad
errors/bit-day
MeV-cm2/m9
MIPS
MIPS/W
sec
C
Levels of
Reconfigurability
Number of
Technologies
Included
GB/cm 2
%
0.1 (si)
1.00E-12
0.3 (Si) 6
1.00E-13
100 Immune
500 3000 6
500 2000 6
1.00E-03
6
6
-180 -230 6
3 4 6
2
1
4
100
10095
The following examples of Constellation program mission concepts exemplify the need for advanced radiation-
hardened electronics and processors. The examples are primary drivers of the derived requirements and key
performance parameters defined for RHESE in Table 1.
A. Autonomous Landing and Hazard Avoidance
Exploration missions will be required to deploy resources to execute or sustain missions at lunar or Martian sites.
Although numerous vision system options exist, all of the systems require computationally,intensive routines such
as map matching and real-time feature tracking. The ability to implement autonomous landing and hazard
avoidance technology (ALHAT) and the resultant precision with which resources are deployed to the lunar surface
is directly affected by the performance of the data processor. Designers have expressed concerns that the currently
available state-of-the-art radiation-hardened processors may not have sufficient processing speeds for appropriately
hosting and running the vision system-based hazard avoidance algorithms. And because of the critical nature of
landing resources, commercial or "soft" processors are not acceptable solutions.
B. Autonomous Vehicle Operations
Exploration requirements document the need for autonomous vehicle operations. Round-trip signal times
between ground controllers and any unmanned rovers would create real-time navigation delays and inefficient
operations. This paradigm requires autonomous surface systems capable of independently navigating unknown
terrain, recording the terrain observation, and storing the information for future playback. Processors with increased
capabilities are accordingly needed to implement these requirements. RHESE deliverables will increase the
performance of capabilities required for autonomous surface mobility, such as rover stereo vision, hazard avoidance,
and path planning.
C. Critical Mission Stages
Certain stages of a spaceflight mission are extremely critical in their execution and timing. Examples include
launch sequences, course trajectory correction firings, and entry, decent and landing sequences. An untimely
radiaiton event striking a critical electronic part could cause an entire mission to fail should the event occur during
one of the critical mission stages. Designers of the Constellation projects must consider the risks of such an event
occuring and the mitigation of the risk through the -use of radiation-hardened parts and radiation hardened assurance
methodologies.
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D. Distributed System Architectures within long duration, extreme radiation
When developing the avionics and electronics for surface systems designed to endure harsh environments, the
current method of protecting the electronics is to cocoon them in a heated and insulated "warm box" central to the
system's architecture. From this box, primary and redundant cabling is strung between the control electronics and
all sensors, cameras, detectors, motors, actuators, and other components located at the extremities of the system
architecture. This design limits the ability to create a truly distributed, modular electronics system, resulting in
excessive point-to-point wiring, increased system weight, increased system complexity, and reduced reliability.
This problem is anticipated to grow more challenging as larger more complex rovers are developed.
RHESE proactively responds to these anticipated Constellation mission concepts by formulating the
development of advanced materials, processors, reconfigurable computers, and models of the effects radiation
produces within modern electronics. The following section summarizes these RHESE technology development
products.
IV. RHESE Project Overview
In response to the Constellation Program's anticipated requirement for radiation-hardened electronics, the ETDP
office established the RHESE project. RHESE provides a broad-scoped approach to providing hardened space
electronics. Investment areas include new materials, design processes, reconfigurable hardware techniques, and
software techniques. Near-term emphasis within the multiple RHESE tasks focuses on hardening Field
Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA)s for use in reconfigurable architectures and on developing electronic
components using semiconductor materials (such as Silicon Germanium (SiGe)) to enhance a devices tolerance to
radiation events and low temperature environments. As these technologies mature, the project shifts its focus to
efforts encompassing total processor hardening techniques. This phased approach to distributing emphasis between
technology developments allows RHESE to provide hardened FPGA devices and environmentally hardened
electronic units for mission infusion into early Constellation projects such as the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle
and the Ares V Launch Vehicle. Once these technologies begin the infusion process, the RHESE project then shifts
its technology development focus to hardened, high speed processors with associated memory elements and high
density storage for the longer duration missions, such as the Lunar Lander, the Lunar Outpost, and eventual Mars
Exploration missions occurring later in the Constellation schedule.
To ensure any new advanced technology being developed for use on a flight vehicle is sufficiently mature,
NASA employs a technology rating standard - known to technologists as the Technology Readiness Level (TRL)
scale - to assist with the assessment of a technology's maturation and test. Figure 1 shows the standard definitions
NASA uses to rate a technology's TRL. By meeting the requirements of each level within the TRL scale, a
technology advances in rank and maturity until it is ready for flight. The ETDP fosters the development of advanced
System Test, Launch
& Operations
System/Subsystem
Development
Technology
Demonstration
Technology
Development
Research to Prove
Feasibility
Basic Technology
Research
Actual system "flight proven" through successful
mission operations
Actual system completed and "flight qualified"
through test and demonstration (Ground or Flight)
System prototype demonstration in a space
environment
System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration
in a relevant environment (Ground or Space)
Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant
environment
Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory
environment
Analytical and experimental critical function and/or
characteristic proof-of=concept
Technology concept and/or application formulated
Basic principles observed and reported
Figure 1. Technology Readiness Level Definitions.
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technologies through the TRL 6 level. Once this level of maturity is attained, the technology is "graduated" to be
infused into a flight project where it continues to mature through the TRL 9 level. RHESE complies with the
technology maturity approach in that all of the products developed under the RHESE project have goals of TRL 6
maturity prior to delivery to an application.
The tasks within RHESE are broad-based and diverse. They collectively include the development of: total dose
radiation tolerant electronics, Single Event Upset (SEU)-tolerant electronics, latch-up tolerant electronics, high
performance processors, low temperature electronics, reconfigurable robust electronics, and updated models capable
of predicting the effects of radiation on electronics. Specifically, the RHESE tasks are:
• Model of Radiation Effects on Electronics (MREE),
• Single Event Effects (SEE) Immune Reconfigurable Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) (SIRF),
• Radiation Hardened High Performance Processors (HPP),
• Reconfigurable Computing (RC),
• Silicon-Germanium (SiGe) Integrated Electronics for Extreme Environments.
Each of these tasks will be summarized in the following sections.
A. Model of Radiation Effects on Electronics (MREE)
RHESE's MREE task is focused on developing an updated model of radiation effects on electronics. The previously
used model, CREME96 _3,has been for years the industry standard modeling tool for radiation effects on electronics.
However, over the past eleven years since its release, the state-of-the-art in microelectronics has continued to
advance toward architectures that incorporate smaller feature sizes, multilayered electronic structures, and metals
containing heavy elements - all of which make today's modern electronic architectures more susceptible to radiation
damage. Because the CREME96 model is deficient in accounting for an increasing number of features common to
modern electronic architectures, the MREE task is developing an update to this model.
The new model being developed is critically needed to guide the selection of modern radiation hard components
for use in space systems. Designers will employ this updated model to predict the mean-time-between-failure
(MTBF) of their circuit designs when they choose to use state-of-the-art commercial grade or radiation hardened
parts. This modeling effort will also develop a tool designed to estimate the frequency of the various single event
effects such as logic upsets and circuit latch-up as well as the total radiation dose effects in microelectronic devices
operated in the space environment.
The modeling tool will possess the additional feature of being capable of considering the vehicle's exact
structure for purposes of calculating the shielding effect provided when assessing the susceptibility of a particular
microelectronic circuit to high energy particle radiation. This approach also allows the exact physical structure of the
microelectronic circuit and the exact pattern of hole-electron creation within that circuit structure to be taken into
account so that the resulting charges and currents within the circuit can be determined accurately The model
employs a Monte Carlo method of simulation to evaluate the electronic architecture under radiation conditions.
These codes will propagate individual particles, selected at random from the external particle environment striking
the spacecraft, to the chip. During propagation the effects of nuclear interactions and energy loss by ionization will
be taken into account. By propagating a large sample of particles from the external environment though the vehicle
and the device under evaluation, the model makes an estimate of the device's accumulated total dose and the single
event rate probability, all while considering the device's location within the space vehicle under any external
environment model and in any orbit that is chosen.
The MREE task is jointly developed by NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center and Vanderbilt University.
MSFC provides the models for the radiation environments to be used for the estimation of single event effects and
total dose under various space weather conditions. MSFC also provides Monte Carlo computer code to propagate the
external radiation environment through the actual design of the spacecraft structure to the microelectronic chip that
is being investigated. The result will be a list of individual particle descriptions and coordinates at the chip which are
fed into the code generated by Vanderbilt University. These particle lists will also be used to predict the total
radiation dose to the electronics.
Vanderbilt University models the physical structure of the microelectronic circuit within the semiconductor
material of the chip and propagates the individual particles from the fist prepared by MSFC through the device
structure. The Vanderbilt code will account for nuclear reactions, energy loss and hole-electron pair creation within
and nearby the microelectronic circuit components. Vanderbilt will also develop classes to track the collection of
charge onto the nodes of the microcircuit from the distribution of hole-electron pairs created by the ionizing particle.
There will also be code that examines how the circuit responds both to the charges collected on various nodes and to
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thecurrentsresultingfromtheratesofchargecollectionatvariouspointsinthecircuit.Inparticular,therewillbe
codethatpredictswhetherthepassageofthechargedparticlethrought echipleadstoanysingleventeffects.
Finally,justasthemodel'spredecessors,CREME96,andCREME86beforethat,wereallavailableforuseon
theinternet,sowillthismodelbeavailable.AnticipatedreleaseofthefirstversionoftheMREEtoolisin2009.
B. Single Event Effects (SEE)-Immune Reconfigurable Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) (SIRF)
The FPGA is an electronic component that has experienced widespread usage in multiple applications due to its
ease of programmability. Because the FPGA can be customized, it is also an inexpensive, and therefore attractive,
alternative to the design and development of a non-programmable, hardwired application-specific integrated circuit
(ASIC). FPGAs are available in multiple architectures. The most common is the SRAM-based FPGA, which is
reprogrammable within an active system to perform a large variety of functions. But they are much like volatile
memory in that they require reconflguration after each power cycle. Also, due to their CMOS-based architecture,
they are susceptible to radiation events. Antifuse FPGAs solve the volatility and radiation susceptibility problem by
allowing a single configuration to be permanently programmed onto the device. The nature of the antifuse
architecture makes it intrinsically radiation-hardened, but the main disadvantage of this architecture is that it can
only be programmed once prior to use.
In an effort to address the radiation hardness of a SRAM-based FPGA, the RHESE project is teaming with
multiple government and industry partners to support the development of a radiation-tolerant version of the Xilinx
Vertex-5 FPGA. The resulting device will yield the benefits of reconfigurable hardware without requiring the
encumbrances typically required to harden reconfigurable devices to radiation effects, such as chip area, speed,
power, and complexity. SIRF FPGAs can be used to implement systems that incorporate radiation-tolerant
reconfigurable interfaces and digital interconnects. This capability will facilitate design of common 'plug-and-play'
modular, adaptive and reconfigurable subsystems. Such subsystems can be field programmed and reprogrammed to
implement multiple functions in diverse systems.
A SIRF-based processor board could, for example, be removed from a lunar storage depot and inserted into a
rover navigation system. Upon insertion, the board will autonomously download configuration data, configure its
electrical interfaces and internal interconnects, and execute the desired functionality. It will also continuously
monitor its performance and self-reconflgure to mitigate faults, should they occur.
The same board can, should the need arise, be removed from the rover and be used to replace a malfunctioning
board in an oxygen generating system. Once inserted, it will be autonomously configured for this application.
Significant systems efficiencies including development, fault-tolerance, maintenance, repair, and inventory control
will result from this capability.
In addition, SIRF-based technologies can be used for high-bandwidth sensor back-end applications, e.g. vision
processing, radar and LIDAR, since gate array-based processors demonstrate significant performance advantages
over serial processors when implementing tasks that can be parallelized. SIRF will have the additional advantage of
being able to realize this performance advantage without the inefficiencies associated with single-event effect
mitigation techniques.
Though the effort is primarily supported by the SlRF task partners, NASA will provide complimentary analysis
of these technologies to determine applicability to future space systems. NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center is
responsible for managing NASA's involvement in the SlRF task.
C. High Performance Processors (HPP)
Capabilities that can increase the effectiveness or the efficiency with which Exploration Systems challenges are
addressed can be data processing intensive. Among these capabilities are autonomous systems involving spacecraft
operations, surface mobility, and hazard avoidance and landing. Whereas numerous systems with these capabilities
have been deployed, their requirements and implementations are typically constrained by data processing
throughput, power resources, and radiation effects. The RHESE High Performance Processors for Space
Environments (HPP) task will expand the capabilities of data processing-intensive spaceflight systems by
significantly advancing the sustained throughput and processing efficiency of high-performance radiation-hardened
processors.
The performance of processors developed with technologies appropriate for aerospace environments lags that of
commercial processors by multiple performance generations. For example, one of the "flagship" radiation-tolerant
processors-- the RAD750-- exhibits a sustained throughput rate that is approximately two-orders of magnitude less
than the commercially available Intel Centrino processor, used in many desktop and laptop computers.
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Whereas radiation tolerant COTS-based boards that offer increased performance are available, the performance
is offered at expense of reduced power efficiency. This HPP task seeks to concurrently advance the state-of-the-art
of two metrics (sustained throughput and processing efficiency) of high-performance radiation-hardened processors.
The need for power-efficient high-performance radiation-tolerant processors and the peripheral electronics
required to implement functional systems is not unique to NASA; this capability could also benefit commercial
aerospace entities and other govemmental agencies that require highly-capable spaceflight systems. This task will
therefore leverage to the extent practical, relevant extemal technology- and processor-development projects
sponsored by other organizations. Accordingly, important factors in defining and implementing the HPP strategy
and implementation are the investment plans of these organizations and cognizance of relevant prior and ongoing
NASA investments. The HPP team is address both of these factors.
This effort will be addressed from a system-level perspective; meeting the objectives will require peripheral
devices that exhibit performance and environmental characteristics consistent with the processor. This task will
therefore also investigate the availability and development status of components required to realize nominal high-
performance spaceflight systems architectures.
Although the primary discriminating factors, sustained processor performance, power efficiency, and radiation
tolerance, are among the metrics identified in Table 1, an equally important factor is the availability of tools to
support the software development flow. A very capable component will not be accepted by the community if its
tool flow is considered inadequate. Furthermore, software tools development can be a very expensive endeavor; any
significant effort would be beyond the scope of the HPP task.
The deliverables from this task will be validated in realistic system- and architectural-contexts to ensure the
projected performance advances can be realized not just at the component level but, most importantly, at a flight
system level.
Processor verification plans will ensure the deliverables map to detailed customer requirements. These
requirements will address several issues, including performance characteristics, environmental susceptibilities,
physical characteristics, and compatibility with targeted software compilers, development systems and operating
systems. Management board reviews and peer reviews will be conducted on a regular and as-needed basis to assess
compliance with requirements. Each plan will follow a consistent framework but incorporate sufficient flexibility to
accommodate the specific tasks associated with the HPP task.
In the end, the task deliverables shall include a high-performance, radiation-hardened general-purpose processor
and a high-performance, radiation-hardened special-purpose processor. Not that these specific processors are the
only ones required. The task objective may be accomplished with multiple types of processors or processor cores,
given the broad range of applications that will require significant processing capability. Targeted classes include
high-capability general purpose processors (e.g. a RAD750-type technology), instrument-level general purpose
processors (e.g, ColdFire or microcontroller technology), and special purpose processors (e.g. FPGA-resident soft-
or hard-core, reconfigurable processor, DSP, host processor/coprocessor).
This task is lead by NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center, with support from Marshall Space Flight Center,
Langley Research Center, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.
D. Reconfigurable Computing (RC)
The concept of RC offers the promise of new capabilities within any particular plan of exploration that involves
multiple complex spacecraft. These new capabilities focus on the reduction of subsystem level flight spares
inventories for long-duration missions, adaptability to system failures, and flexibility in connecting components
through a variety of data interfaces. The RC task proposes a new paradigm for circuitry to resPOnd to failures other
than by redundancy voting schemes alone. This new paradigm will not only better detect failed circuitry, but will
accomplish actual repair or replacement of defects, adapting circuitry to accommodate system failures. The
paradigm also provides the concept of requiring a single conflgurable processor to autonomously conform to
multiple configurations. Accomplishment of this goal yields a reduction in spares required to be carried on long-
duration missions, since a single spare would then fit many processing functions. Such architecture adaptability will
provide a great saving in spares volume and weight required by extended duration missions.
Cyclical and/or selective periodic testing will mitigate radiation damage and other commonly-feared failures.
Reserve copies of circuitry will be generated and tested in order to bring them online in functional condition without
interrupting system tasks. Then, the subsystem to be evaluated will be taken offline and tested with known inputs
for known expected outputs in order to isolate possible undesirable response. Provided the subsystem checks out as
functionally correct, it can be returned to service, held in reserve for the next cycle of checks, or disassembled so
that its circuitry may be returned to overall system reserve. If the subsystem fails verification, the portions of
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circuitrycausingthefailuremaybefurtherisolatedtomarkthosepartsofthecircuitryasdefectiveandreturnthe
remainderto eserve,muchasblocksofacomputerharddiskaremarkedbadandignoredduringfutureoperations.
Lifelimitationsonelectronicsanbemitigatedbythesesamemeans.Circuitrywhichbecomesunstableand
unreliableafterextendedactivelifetimecanberetiredandnewreservecircuitrypoweredupandconfguredinto
service,thusextendingoveralllifetimeofthesystem.
Flexibilityisalsobolsteredbyreconfigurablecomputing.Interfacer configurationca allowasingleprocessor
makeconnectionsthroughdifferentnetworksasneeded,providingmoreoptionsinoverallsystemconfiguration.
Thissupportsvehiclesystemintegritybyallowingprocessorsto betransferredamongbussesandnetworksto
replacelostfunctionality,andsupportsheconceptof reducedflightsparesrequiredtomaintainlongduration
missions.
ThreeareasoffocushavebeenidentifiedfortheRCtask;internalmodularity,externalmodularity,andfault
detectiona dmitigation.Thefirstinvolvesabilityofthecoreprocessort emulateanyformofcomputingresource
asneededtoserveallofthecapacitiesrequired.The second enables the first by providing a capability to interface
resources to any target system, by adapting communication standards, physical and electrical interconnections, and
other parameters of the host system to hook up to the computing resource. The final allows the detection of an
internal fault and autonomous isolation and recovery from the fault without required external involvement.
Verification of the capabilities produced will be accomplished by two means, both involving testing. First, since
exposure to harsh environments will not necessarily guarantee errors, and even supposing errors do result, their
nature and behavior cannot be rigorously controlled, it will be necessary to induce known errors. Various means for
inducing these errors in a methodical manner, in order to cover the full spectrum of foreseeable malfunctions, will
have to be devised. Second, testing in actual environmental chambers will be carried out to simply satisfy the
validity of the schemes under harsh conditions representative of planned target flight environments.
Finally, increasingly complex forms of fault identification and response are to be studied and applied; those
relying particularly on the strengths of RC itself will allow substitution of tested computing resources for those in
line for maintenance to allow removal, testing, and refurbishment of the latter without interruption of system
operation.
The RC task plans to have as deliverables the following items:
• Reconfigurable computers supporting multiple architectures to enable single spares to fulfill multiple electronic
functions,
• Reconfigurable computers supporting avionics redundancy by providing adaptable spares,
• Reconfigurable computers supporting recovery from component damage by radiation strikes and other events,
and
• Reconfigurable computers supporting multiple interfacing and interconnection options.
This task is managed by NASA's Marshall Space Flighl Center with support from NASA's Langley Research
Center.
E. Silicon-Germanium (SiGe) Integrated Electronics for Extreme Environments
The RHESE SiGe task has as its goal the development and demonstration of extreme environment electronic
components required for lunar robotic systems with distributed architecture, using low-cost, commercial SiGe
BiCMOS technology _4_8.The SiGe BiCMOS offers unparalleled low temperature performance, wide temperature
capability, and optimal mixed-signal design flexibility at the monolithic level by offering power efficient, high speed
devices (SiGe HBTs) and high density Si CMOS.
The approach to implementing this task is to demonstrate system-critical SiGe BiCMOS mixed-signal integrated
circuit components capable of operating reliably from -180°C to +120°C while under radiation exposure. In
addition to the electronics, the packaging of the developed part is also required to be reliable for the specified
temperature range. The SiGe development effort culminates in the development and test of a flight-ready remote
electronics unit (REU) system prototype to serve as a general purpose, extreme environment ready, sensors and
control interface system-in-package for NASA missions. The planned verification and testing strategy will consist
of characterization of the various SiGe mixed-signal components as a function of temperature, from -180°C to
120°C. Tests will also include radiation characterization to a total dose of at least 100 krad, life testing at the
temperature extremes (-180°C and 120°C), and over-temperature part and package thermal cycle testing. Additional
testing of components at cryogenic temperatures under radiation exposure will be used to evaluate the combined
effects of temperature and radiation. When complete, the SiGe task will have matured a critical technology allowing
many electronic components and data devices to be mounted such that they are exposed to the extremes of the space
environment and no longer require the conditioning provided by the system's warm box.
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The contract for this task is managed by NASA's Langley Research Center with support from the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory. The Georgia Institute of Technology is the prime contractor and leads a team made of multiple
academic and industrial partners.
V. Conclusion
NASA is currently in the process of developing the spacecraft and missions that will fulfill the goals of the VSE,
with a primary emphasis on long duration lunar missions. Because of the known radiation hazard within space and
on the lunar surface, radiation hardened electronics are anticipated to be required in the avionics and processors
flown aboard the spacecraft being developed under the Constellation program. Designers of spacecraft that must
face the radiation hazard should follow the methodology of RHA. To successfully implement RHA for the
electronic systems on a spacecraft, there are multiple levels of design that may be influenced with techniques to
improve a part's performance within the radiation environment. These techniques include RHBA, RHBD, and
RHBP methodologies. They may be used independently or in combination - depending on the level of risk
acceptance and funding available to the spacecraft designer. The RHESE project proactively responds to the
anticipated requirements of these spacecraft through the development of materials, processors, reconfigurable
systems, and models of the effects radiation will produce within these electronics, thereby assisting the eventual
spacecraft designer with the ability to implement RHA.
References
INational Aeronautics and Space Administration, The Vision for Space Exploration, Feb. 2004, URL:
Hhttp://history.nasa.gov/Vision For Space Exploration.pdfI-/]cited 10 August 2007].
2Tribble, Alan C., The Space Environment, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1995, Chap. 5.
3Greisen, K., "End to the Cosmic Ray Spectrum?," Physics Review Letters, Vol. 16, Apr. 1966, pp. 748-750.
4Zatsepin, G.T.; and Kuzmin, V.A., Pisma Zh. Eksp. Teor. Fiz., Vol. 4, No. 78, 1966.
5Townsend, L. W., Nealy, J. E., Wilson, J. W., and Atwell, W., "Large Solar Flare Radiation Shielding Requirements for
Manned Interplanetary Missions," Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1989, pp. 126-128.
6Sterpone, 1., Violante, M., "Analysis of the Robustness of the TMR Architecture in SRAM-Based FPGAs," 1EEE
Transactions on Nuclear Science, Vol. 52, No. 5, Oct. 2005, pp. 1545-1549.
7Wakerly, J. F., "Microcomputer Reliability Improvement Using Triple-Modular Redundancy," Proceedings of The IEEE,
Vol. 64, No. 4, June 1976, pp. 889-895.
8Dickinson, M., Jackson, J., Randa, G., "Saturn V Launch Vehicle Digital Computer and Data Adapter," Proceedings - Fall
Joint Computer Conference, 1964, pp. 501-516.
9Roncoli, R. B., Ludwinski, J. M., "Mission Design Overview for the Mars Exploration Rover Mission," AIAA Paper AIAA-
2002-4823, AIAA/AAS Astrodynamics Specialist Conference and Exhibit, 5-8 Aug. 2002.
l°Lam, D. Y., Lan, J., McMurchie, L., and Sechen, C., "SEE-Hardened-by-Design Area-Efficient SRAMs," Aerospace 2005
IEEE Conference, 5-12 Mar. 2005.
11LaBel, K. A., Johnson, A. H., Barth, J. L., Reed, R. A., and Barnes, C. E., "Emerging Radiation Hardness Assurance(RHA)
Issues: A NASA Approach for Space Flight Programs," IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, Vol. 45, No. 6, Dec. 1998, pp.
2727-2736.
lZMankins, J. C., "Technology Readiness Levels," NASA White Paper, 06 Apr. 1995, URL:
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/trl/trl.pdf [cited 10 August 2007].
13Tylka, A. J., Adams, J.A., Jr., Boberg, P. R., Brownstein, B., Dietrich, W. F., Flueckiger, E.O., Peterson, E. L., Shea, M.A.,
Smart, D. F., Smith, E. C., "CREME96: A Revision of the Cosmic Ray Effects on Micro-Electronics Code," 1EEE Transactions
on Nuclear Science, Vol. 44, No. 6, Part 1, Dec. 1997, pp. 2150-2160.
_4Cressler, J. D., "On the Potential of SiGe HBTs for Extreme Environment Electronics," Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol. 93,
No. 9, Sep. 2005, pp. 1559-1582.
15Cressler, J. D., "Using SiGe HBTs for Extreme Environment Electronics," Proceedings of the 2005 1EEE Bipolar/BiCMOS
Circuits and Technology Meeting, 2005, pp. 248-251.
16Cressler, J. D., "SiGe HBT Reliability Issues Associated with Operation in Extreme Environments," Proceedings of the
2006 IEEE Topical Meeting on Silicon Monolithic Integrated Circuits in RF Systems, 2006, pp. 3-7.
_TCressler, J. D., Mojarradi, M., Blalock, B., Johnson, W., Niu, G., Dai, F., Mantooth, A., Holmes, J., Alles, M., Reed, R.,
McCluskey, P., Berger, R., Garbos, R., Peltz, L., Joseph, A., and Eckert, C., "SiGe Integrated Electronics for Extreme
Environments," Proceedings of the 2007 GOMAC-Tech - Government Microcircuit Applications and Critical Technology
Conference, 2007, pp. 327-331.
_8Cressler, J. D., "SiGe BiCMOS Technology: an IC Design Platform for Extreme Environment Electronics Applications,"
Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE International Reliability Physics Symposium, 2007, pp. 141-149.
10
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
